This study examines the impact of China's dominant position among the BRIS countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. Particularly, by using a dynamic factor model estimated over the period 1995Q2-2009Q4, it investigates how supply and demand shocks from China are transmitted to these economies. The results show that China's supply shocks are more important than its demand shocks. Supply shocks produce positive and signi…cant output responses in all BRIS countries. International trade is an important channel for the transmission of shocks across China and BRIS countries indicating that supply and demand shocks in China do not have similar e¤ects on the BRIS countries and therefore they require di¤erent policy responses.
Introduction
Increasing economic integration, especially through trade and …nancial ‡ows among countries, has been one of the most remarkable events in the world over the last two decades. Many emerging economies have gained in prominence as their economic activities now have signi…cant ripple e¤ects in other countries including the developed ones (Akin and Kose, 2008) . In as far as geo-politics is concerned the large emerging economies -Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (SA) -are rapidly becoming integrated and important to the world economy (see Çak¬r and Kabundi, 2013a, b) . They intended to strengthen their mutual cooperation within the form of the alliance of the BRICS group. China is obviously the dominant actor among this emerging group. This paper therefore focuses on China, because its integration with the global economy and within BRICS is deeper than that of any other country. Our interest in this paper is to identify supply and demand shocks in China and their channels of transmission. To achieve that we use a dynamic factor model estimated over the period 1995Q2-2009Q4.
The reason for assessing the impact of China's shocks to BRIS is based on the fact that China's growth has changed the distribution of economic activities across the world. Its share of the world's GDP now stands at 14%, making it the second largest economy after the US (IMF, 2012). Its high economic growth 1 and increased openness have led to it becoming a major player in the global economy (Siklos, 2010) . China has now an economic powerhouse that signi…cantly contributes to economic recoveries after meltdowns. For example, when the US subprime crisis triggered a global …nancial crisis in 2008, which slowed global economic growth, China's economy grew by 9.1% in 2009. China's status as one of the most important countries in the world is not overstated, as it is the world's second largest economy, a nuclear weapons state, a permanent member of United Nations Security Council, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves and a rising power whose in ‡uence is spreading across the globe. Thus, China's growing importance as an assembly platform for exports of manufactures, a destination for foreign investment, and a consumer of imported technology, raw materials and industrial goods is not a one-time shock; rather, it is an on-going process that continually shape the balance of global supply and demand (Eichengreen and Tong, 2005) . As a strategic power that is intent on rivaling the US, China is projected to surpass the US in 2030 to become the world's largest economy (Maddison, 2006) . China therefore signi…cantly raises the status and pro…le of the other BRICS countries (Lo, 2008) .
There is already rich literature that focuses on China's trade and …nancial integration with the world (Cheung, Ghosh and Rao, 2010, and Tokarick, 2011) . However, little research has been conducted on China's economic in ‡uence on the other countries, save for Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2011) who have studied the impact of China on developed economies and Hsieh and Ossa (2011) who have assessed the welfare impact of the observed pattern of sector-level growth in China on fourteen major countries and four broad world regions. However, none of these studies, or any other study to date, has considered the impact of China's economic activities on the other BRICS countries.
The expansion of international trade has been a particularly remarkable aspect of China's rising prominence in the world economy. Between 1995 and 2009, China's exports and imports grew at an average rate of around 20% and 18%, but in 2009 they both decreased at around 16% and 11%, respectively. China's largest trading partners in terms of total exports and imports are the US and Japan (IMF, 2012).
China's trade with Japan and the US decreased signi…cantly over the last decade. For instance, its imports from Japan decreased from around 17.5% to 13% of total imports and exports to Japan decreased from 17% to 8%. International trade, especially exports is a major driver of economic growth of China. Taken together, exports and imports amount to over two-thirds of its GDP (IMF, 2012) . This is partly due to the heavy involvement of the manufacturing sector in international production chains and its policies on technology development (Tan and Khor, 2006; Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, 2006, and Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2007 ). This high growth in trade has been supported by large investment ‡ows (Eichengreen and Tong, 2005) . For instance, it received an average of around 4% net foreign direct investments (FDI) of GDP between 1995 and 2010 (WB, 2011). China's FDI is export oriented and also directed in part to investment in infrastructure. Given the signi…cantly larger shares of private capital ‡ows in China's GDP and its tilt towards exports and growth promoting infrastructure, it is clear that the increased integration of China into the world economy contributes to its rapid growth. Also, China's growth has bene…ted signi…cantly from the world wide fragmentation of production where parts of the production chain have been moved to low cost countries (Den Butter and Hayat, 2008) .
As China's trade with the rest of the world deepens, so is the shift of the composition and geographical pattern of its trade. Its imports are growing rapidly as it is now the third largest importer of developing countries' goods after the US and the European Union. China's trade with the BRIS countries is also growing rapidly and China is now among the most important export destinations for these economies. Imports from the BRIS countries increased between 2001 and 2009, except for Russia (Figure 1) . From the point of view of its source of imports among the BRIS, Russia was the main supplier of China (3.3%). But in 2009, Brazil became China's biggest import market when it supplied 2.8% of China's total imports. China's imports from India and SA increased from 0.7% and 0.5% in 2001 to 1.4% and 0.9% in 2009, respectively. In terms of total exports, in 2001, Russia was the top export market for China's goods (1%), followed by India (0.7%), Brazil (0.5%) and SA (0.4%). However, in 2009, India overtook Russia and became the leading export destination of China (2.5%), followed by Russia, Brazil and SA which received 1.2%, 1.5% and 0.6% in that order. The intensity of trade linkages between China and the BRIS countries is di¤erent for each of the countries. In 2009, Brazil, India and Russia are intensively linked to China, while SA has somewhat weak linkages with China ( Figure 1 ). Exports to Imports from
As a consequence, China has provided an opportunity and a market for primary commodity exporters from developing countries. This has helped raise economic growth in a number of developing countries in recent years (Jenkins, 2008) . Thus, the emergence of China as a large trading nation and destination of international investment is likely to have positive spillover e¤ects on its trading partners. Hence, one might expect China to have a signi…cant e¤ect on BRIS countries'economic activity. This paper assesses the in ‡uence of China on BRIS and it identi…es channels through which shocks are transmitted. It is essential to identify how positive supply shock from China a¤ects macroeconomic variables of the BRIS countries. In addition, the question arises as to whether the demand shock is transmitted di¤erently. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the …rst attempt to investigate the impact and the transmission of China's supply and demand shocks to the BRIS countries.
The study …nds three main characteristics of the transmissions. First, China's supply shocks to BRIS are transmitted more forcefully than its demand shocks. Second, the reaction of BRIS to China's shocks varies across countries. For example, positive supply shocks have positive, permanent and signi…cant e¤ects on Brazil's, Russia's and SA's output, while it has positive but short-lived e¤ect on India's output. Positive demand shocks from China have positive and signi…cant e¤ect on Brazil's and SA's output only. Finally, the magnitude and the channels of transmission of shocks also vary from one country to another. The results based on the variance share of the common component suggest that SA and Russia are intensively linked to China, while Brazil and India have rather modest economic linkages with China. The main channels of transmission for all shocks are exports and imports between China and SA; imports and short-term interest rate between China and Brazil; exports and short-term interest rates between China and Russia, and exports, imports and short-term interest rate between China and India. The transmission channels are mainly trade channels rather than …nancial.
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the dynamic factor model and the identi…cation of supply and demand shocks. Section 3 analyses the data, their transformation and the estimation technique. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and the transmission channels. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Methodology
This section includes two main steps. It …rstly introduces the dynamic factor model 2 to investigate the common components of a large number of macroeconomic variables and then the process of identi…cation of structural shocks that explain the common components of the variables of interest.
The factor model
Factor analysis has been successfully considered in models consisting of large number of variables. Classical factor models were initiated by Sargent and Sims (1977) and Geweke (1977) . These models have been applied by Singleton (1980) , Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) , and Stock and Watson (1998), among others. The main idea of factor models is that all the information included in a large dataset could be captured by a few key common factors. These factors represent the hidden forces underlying the co-movement of observable series. The co-movement of contemporaneous time series is due to the fact that they are arising largely from a relatively few key economic factors, such as productivity, monetary policy, trade linkages, …nancial linkages and oil price shocks. In this paper, the unobserved factors assist in the identi…cation of supply and demand shocks within a data-rich environment framework. Various methods have been proposed to construct these common factors, the simplest is the principal component analysis introduced by Stock and Watson (2002a) .
Recently, the dynamic factor model has become very popular in economics. 3 Suppose there are N number of di¤erent observable economic variables, each one consisting of T observations. It is assumed that, for each observation in time t, all the N individuals partially depend on a small number, r, of non-observable, or latent common factors. Assume that Y t is represented as the sum of the two latent components, a common component, X t = (x 1t ; x 2t ; :::; x N t ) 0 , and the idiosyncratic component, t = (" 1t ; " 2t ; :::; " N t ) 0 .
Thus, an approximate dynamic factor model of Watson (1998, 2002a) can be represented as
where X is the product of a q dimensional vector of common factors, and = is a vector of r common factors. The common component of each series, which is driven by a small number of shocks common to all variables, is the part of the series that depends on the common factors. However, the e¤ects of the common shocks are di¤erent for each variable because of the di¤erent factor loadings. The idiosyncratic component is the part of the series driven by idiosyncratic shocks that are speci…c to each variable and it is orthogonal to the common factors. Unlike the vector autoregressive (VAR) process, the factor model can accommodate a large number of variables. The estimation of the parameters of Equation (1) generally lies in the analysis of the variance-covariance matrix of the observable data X. All the N series depend on r factors, meaning that there is a r-dimensional matrix representing the N series. This dimension reduction matrix corresponds to the choice of the largest eigenvalues of the variance-covariance matrix of Y . Therefore, the …rst largest eigenvalues and eigenvectors are calculated from the variance-covariance matrix cov (Y t ),
where V 0 is the N r matrix of eigenvectors corresponding to the largest r eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of Y t . The common factors, F t , are estimated in a consistent manner by applying standard principal component analysis to Y t ,
where the factor loadings, , is equal to V , an estimate of the matrix of factor loadings. Hence, the idiosyncratic components are
Then, the number of static factors, r, for the above mentioned dynamic factor model, are estimated using Bai and Ng (2002) 
where is a r r matrix and t a r t vector of residuals. Equation (5) characterises the dynamic of common factors. We follow the approach proposed by Chamberlain (1983) and Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) which allows for a mild serial correlation of the idiosyncratic errors, but the weak correlation vanishes with the law of large numbers.
Identi…cation of structural shocks
The identi…cation of structural shocks is based on the reduced form VAR model in Equation (5) . This study follows the identi…cation scheme proposed by Faust (1998) In the …rst step, the reduced form VAR residuals, t , are orthogonalised using the Cholesky decomposition. The vector of orthogonalised residuals is t = A 1 t and E t 0 t = 1. Thus,
with A being the r r lower triangular Cholesky matrix. The vector of impulse response functions of y it to the identi…ed shock in period k to t is obtained as
with c i being the i th row of factor loadings of C and the corresponding variancecovariance matrix of the k step ahead forecast error is
ij . In the second step, the main driving forces or shocks of China's GDP are identi…ed. This is achieved by extracting the shocks which maximize the explanation of the chosen variable of the k step ahead of the forecast error variance of GDP out of the orthogonalised residuals. The vector of the main driving forces ! t = (! 1t ; ! 2t ; :::; ! rt ) 0 behind China's GDP growth is assumed to be linearly correlated to the identi…ed shocks through the r r matrix Q,
The objective of the procedure is to choose Q so that the …rst shock explains as much as possible the forecast error variance of China's GDP over a certain horizon k, and the second shock explains as much as possible the remaining forecast error variances. Hence, the forecast error variance explained by the …rst shock is
where i is the China's GDP, and q 1 is the …rst column of Q. Thus, Q is the matrix of eigenvectors of S, (q 1 ; q 2 ; :::q r ), where q 1 (l = 1; :::; r) is the eigenvector corresponding to the l th principal component shock. Uhlig (2003) suggest that the column q 1 should be selected so that q 0 1 2 q 1 is maximized. That is,
where
ij ' ij subject to the side constraint q 0 1 q 1 = 1, which is a normalization condition that can also be written as the Lagrangean,
where being the Lagrangean multiplier. From Equation (11), q 1 is the …rst eigenvector of S ik and is the corresponding eigenvalue. Thus, the shock associated with q 1 is the …rst principal component shock.
In the third step, orthogonal shocks are identi…ed by rotation. The vector of orthogonal two shocks ! t = (! 1t ; ! 2t ) is multiplied by any 2 2-dimensional orthogonal rotation matrix R of the form:
with being the rotation angle, 2 (0; ) which varies on a grid to produce all possible rotations. In this study, the angle of rotation is applied on the …rst two principal component shocks, namely the supply and demand shocks. To account for uncertainty in the factor estimation, a bootstrap technique, which is necessary in constructing con…dence bands, is applied according to Kilian (1998) .
The identi…cation scheme mentioned above is used to identify China's demand and supply shocks. The identi…cation strategy is based on aggregate demand and aggregate supply paradigm, which the core of many macroeconomic textbooks. We have adopted this procedure to avoid unrealistic identi…cation strategy that are commonly used in VAR framework setting to zero short-term restrictions and using long-run restrictions of Blanchard and Quah (1989) . Table 1 provides a summary of the sign restrictions imposed for the identi…cation of shocks.
In line with a typical aggregate demand and aggregate supply diagram, a positive demand shock a¤ects both output and prices positively, while a positive supply shock has a positive e¤ect on output, but prices react negatively. Thus, the central bank is likely to react to a positive supply shock by decreasing the nominal interest rate and increasing it in case of a positive demand shock (Peersman, Table 4 . The data series are obtained from IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the GVAR Toolbox1.0 databases. As required in the factor model, each of the 161 macroeconomic series is transformed to comply with stationarity condition. Two unit root tests, namely the Augmented Dickey-Fuller, hereafter ADF, and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, hereafter the KPSS, (1992) are performed to test for the stationarity of all the series. The KPSS test di¤ers from the ADF tests in that the data series in the former are assumed to be trend-stationary and uses di¤erent null hypothesis of stationarity as opposed to nonstationary. All variables are seasonally adjusted using X12 …lter and transformed into logarithms, except those in percentages and those containing negative values.
We then estimate the number of factors. 4 Bai and Ng, hereafter BN, (2002) suggest six criterions for determining the number factors. All six criterions seek the number of static factors that minimizes the mean squared distance between observed data and common part as estimated by static principal components. The mean squared distance is computed for all the possible number of static factors r up to r max = min fN; T g. The BN criterion can be used to consistently estimate the number of factors where the cross-section dimension, N , and the length of the observed series, T , both go to in…nity. The traditional Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), common in time series fail because they rely on the assumption T N . Bai and Ng (2002) generalizes the C p criteria of Mallows (1973) and obtain the Panel C p (P C p ). In addition, they propose another class of criteria similar to the AIC and the BIC, but they use the logarithmic transformation of the error variance and obtained a panel Information Criteria (IC p ).
5 Both principle components (P C p ) and information criteria (IC p ) estimate the number of factors consistently. Table 2 presents the estimated number of static factors and cumulated variance share by 10 principal components based on the BN test. The dimension of r is six, …ve and eight according to P C p1 , P C p2 and P C p3 criterion, respectively. Furthermore, the criteria IC p1 , IC p2 and the IC p3 suggest estimates for r of three, one and …ve, respectively. We therefore choose 3 factors, r = 3, following the IC p1 criteria. The reason is that IC p criteria are more robust than P C p (Bai and Ng, 2002). Another reason is that if the numbers of common factors are overestimated, the estimated results are still consistent, unlike when the common factors are underestimated (Stock and Watson, 2002b). 
Empirical Results
This section presents empirical results in the form of the impulse response functions and the variance share of the common components. The impulse response analysis shows the direction, magnitude and time path of domestic output, industrial production, exports, imports, FDI in ‡ows and out ‡ows. It also shows share and consumer prices and shortterm interest rates from supply and demand shocks emanating from China. Figures 2-6 show the pro…les of these variables for each of the BRICS countries, where the dotted lines indicate the 90% con…dence intervals. They are calculated over 20 quarters in order to display the cyclical pattern associated with the structural shocks. The variance share of the common component is useful in considering the relative importance of shocks for given variables.
China' s shocks
The impulse response functions of the China's supply and demand shocks and their impact on China's variables are depicted in Figure 2 . The results show that the responses of output, interest rates and in ‡ation to supply and demand shocks are consistent with the predictions of economic theory. The supply shocks increase output and lower interest rates. However, response of in ‡ation is positive, but insigni…cant. In contrast to supply shocks, positive demand shocks induce an immediate increase in output, interest rates and in ‡ation. Positive supply shocks have permanent and long-lasting e¤ect on output, exports, imports, inward FDI ‡ows and share prices. They record a 1%, 0.5%, 0.8%, 1% and 0.7% increases in that order and stay high and signi…cant. Industrial production responds strongly to supply shocks, increasing by 0.8% and stays signi…cant until the eighth quarter. However, the e¤ect on outward FDI ‡ows, short-term interest rates and consumer prices is insigni…cant. Positive demand shocks, on the other hand, have positive but short-lived e¤ects on output and inward FDI ‡ows. The immediate response of these variables to demand shocks is less than 0.5% and the e¤ect dies out after a few quarters. The e¤ect of demand shocks on outward FDI ‡ows, short-term interest rates and consumer prices is positive and signi…cant and stay high over the long term. Finally, and in contrast to supply shocks, demand shocks have no e¤ects on exports, imports and share prices.
The results show that supply shocks are more important and persistent than demand shocks. These …ndings are consistent with the work of Kojima, Nakamura and Ohyama (2005) who point out that the increase in the China's GDP growth rate since 1998 indicates the existence of positive supply shocks. Supply shocks attract more in ‡ows of foreign investments into the country, while demand shocks encourage out ‡ows of foreign investments. Supply shocks have permanent positive e¤ects on inward FDI ‡ows, while demand shocks; on the other hand, have positive and long-lasting impact on outward FDI ‡ows. In addition, the e¤ects of supply shocks on exports and imports are positive and stay high and signi…cant over the entire period. Both exports and imports react to a positive demand shock as expected by theory. The e¤ects are positive and shortlived on both variables. These …ndings are in line with the nature of China's economy that boasts signi…cant current account surplus. The …ndings are further shown to be consistent with the data and the literature as the average share of international trade (exports and imports) amount to over two-thirds of China's GDP (WB, 2011) . This is partly due to the heavy involvement of the manufacturing sector in the international production chains. It also re ‡ects policies of technology adaptation through international integration ( 
Transmission of China' s shocks to BRIS
Figures 3-6 present the impact of China's supply and demand shocks on the BRIS variables. Positive supply shocks have permanent, positive and signi…cant e¤ect, as expected, on real output in all countries with the exception of India. The immediate impact, however, varies across countries, with the highest response recorded in Brazil and Russia. They both record a 1% rise immediately after the shock and increase to 1.5% and 1.7% by the fourth and …fth quarters respectively. The supply shocks are transmitted to SA's output much less forcefully than to Brazil and Russia. But, the immediate a¤ect records an increase of 0.3% and remains positive and signi…cant over the long term. In the case of India, positive supply shocks are positively transmitted to its output, but the e¤ect is signi…cant only for short horizons.
China's supply shocks have permanent and long-lasting e¤ect on both exports and imports of all BRIS countries. It is more likely that supply shock in China is driven by an increase in productivity and a decline in cost of production, given that in the past three decades the country has experienced higher productivity with low cost of production. High productivity combined with low cost of production pushes exports up and increases imports of raw materials. This is in line with the empirical work of Liu, Wang and Wei (2001) who …nd that growth of exports causes the growth of imports. This, in turn, results in higher demand of raw materials from emerging markets, namely Brazil, Russia and SA. Because of higher demand of commodity as the supply shocks trigger exports from these countries (Figures 3-6 ). Secondly, a boost in China's exports lead to an increase in imports from BRIS. That means China's exports trigger imports from BRIS countries (Figures 3-6) .
Positive supply shocks have positive and short-lived e¤ects on SA's FDI in ‡ows and India's FDI in ‡ows and out ‡ows. The shocks, however, are negatively transmitted to SA's and Russia's FDI out ‡ows and Brazil's FDI in ‡ows. On the other hand, China's supply shocks have positive, signi…cant and long-lasting impact on Russia's FDI in ‡ows. Thus, recent movement of FDI ‡ows between China and BRIS supports the fact that foreign direct investments in ‡uence trade among countries. The increase in trade between China and BRIS is supported by rise in FDI ‡ows. For instance, as it has been shown that the growth of China's imports causes the growth in inward FDI to a destination country (Liu, Wang and Wei, 2001 ).
Moreover, positive supply shocks have negative, signi…cant and short-lived e¤ects on short-term interest rates for all BRIS countries. Supply shocks a¤ect SA interest rates more powerfully than the other countries. For instance, SA records a -3% response immediately after the shock and reaches -4% in the third quarter, while the rest of the countries record declines in interest rates that vary between 0.1% and 1%. Monetary policy authorities of BRIS react to positive supply shocks by decreasing the short-term interest rate as a result of low cost of production from China.
Further, positive demand shocks from China are transmitted more forcefully to Brazil, Russia and SA than India. China's demand shocks have positive but shortlived impact on Brazil's, Russia's and SA's output of about 0.05%, 0.03%, and 0.002% and the e¤ect dies out after a few quarters. Even though the e¤ects on India is permanent, it is very small and insigni…cant, reaching a maximum of about 0.0002% after four quarters. Positive demand shocks have small, positive and short-lived e¤ects on SA exports. However, they have negative and short-lived e¤ects on India's imports. For Brazil and Russia, the demand shocks, however, have positive and short-lived e¤ects on both exports and imports. The e¤ect of demand shocks on both FDI in ‡ows and out ‡ows is negative in all BRIS countries, except for FDI in ‡ows in Russia. It has longlasting e¤ects on FDI out ‡ows in Brazil and India, but short-lived e¤ects on SA's and Russia's FDI out ‡ows. The e¤ects of demand shocks on FDI in ‡ows are insigni…cant for SA and India, positive and short-lived for Russia and negative and short-lived for Brazil. Moreover, their e¤ect on interest rates is positive and long-lasting for all the countries.
By dint of the simple fact that China has become the second greatest economic power in the world, it has seen its economic relations with BRIS signi…cantly increase. China is the primary trading partner of BRIS countries and hence the interdependence between China and BRIS is considerably deepening. For instance, in 2001, Chinese exports to India, Russia, Brazil and SA were less than $3 billion in each country, while in 2009 its exports to these countries was $29, $17, $14 and $7 billion, respectively (IMF, 2012). Strong international trade linkages lead to high interdependence among countries. Using three dynamic factors, we obtain variance shares of the common components 48%, 58% and 63% of imports of Brazil, SA and India and 66% of exports of Russia (see Table  3 ). It means trade represents the main channel of transmission of shocks. The high level of dependence of SA trade variables on China's shocks is probably explained by the fact that China became SA's number one trading partner in 2009 (Çak¬r and Kabundi, 2013a). The transmission of shocks vary across countries. For instance, China's shocks are transmitted to Brazil and SA through real variables (industrial production depicts 48% and 53% variance share of common components). Hence, we can say that trade integration leads to synchronization of real variables between China and these countries. Conversely, …nancial and nominal variables exhibit lower variance share of common components for all BRIS countries (25%, 14%, 0.3% and 24% for real exchange rate and 27%, 30%, 0.2% and 0.9% for consumer prices of Brazil, Russia, India and SA, respectively), which means that …nancial markets of BRICS are less integrated. Therefore, the transmission of China's shocks to the BRIS countries is mainly due trade integration instead of …nancial linkages. Moreover, since the common components explains 41%, 44%, 54% and 67% of the variation of SA's, Brazil's, Russia's and India's short term interest rates in that order, it is possible that there is a coordination of policies, probably due to the fact that they are all exposed to common shocks from China and its low cost of production. It is therefore possible to examine the response of BRIS variables to monetary policy shocks from China, but this is beyond the scope of the current study.
Overall, the …ndings show that China's shocks do have di¤erent impacts on each of the BRIS countries. For instance, supply shocks are more forcefully transmitted to BRIS than the demand shocks. Supply shocks have permanent positive and signi…cant e¤ect on real output in all countries, except for India. In case of India, the e¤ect is positive and signi…cant only for short horizons. In addition, the main channels of transmission of all shocks are exports and imports between China and Brazil; exports, imports and inward FDI ‡ows between China and Russia; exports and inward FDI ‡ows between China and India as well as exports and inward FDI ‡ows between China and SA. This shows that, across China and BRIS countries, transmission channels are mainly trade rather than …nancial. It is then possible to refer to the increased volume of trade and investment between China and BRIS countries as evidence of increased international economic integration.
Conclusions
Since China's emergence as a major player into the global economy, there is an increasing interest among policymakers and academics to examine its impact on the other countries, especially developing ones. This paper investigates the impact of China's shocks on the BRIS countries. In particular, two types of shocks, namely positive supply and demand shocks are used to assess the time pro…le of the e¤ects of these shocks. It uses a largedimensional approximate dynamic factor model with quarterly data from 1995Q2 to 2009Q2.
Three main …ndings emerge from the results. First, China's supply shocks are more important than its demand shocks. For instance, supply shocks produce positive and signi…cant output responses in all BRIS countries. However, their e¤ect is signi…cant only for short horizon in India. China's demand shocks have small e¤ects on BRIS relative to supply shocks. Second, the intensity of economic relationship is di¤erent between China and BRIS. China has intensive economic linkages with SA and Russia, while it has rather moderate economic linkages with Brazil and India. Finally, the magnitude and the channels of transmission of shocks vary from one country to another. For instance, the main channels of transmission of all shocks are exports, imports and industrial production between China and SA; imports, industrial production and shortterm interest rates between China and Brazil; exports and short-term interest rates between China and Russia, and exports, imports and short-term interest rates between China and India.
Furthermore, one key channel for the transmission of shocks across China and BRIS is international trade and its main channel of transmission is through supply shocks which dominate the dynamics and have the strongest impact on the BRICS countries. Hence, it can be argued that China's supply and demand shocks do not have similar e¤ects on the BRIS countries and therefore they require di¤erent policy responses. This seems to suggest that China is not yet a locomotive for the world economy because it does not provide extra demand stimulus. However, China's signi…cant demand of raw materials seems to track positive supply shocks, which explains why it seems to a¤ect positively Brazil, Russia and South Africa. 
